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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 We are asked to decide whether the Fair Labor 
Standards Act requires employers to compensate employees 
for breaks of 20 minutes or less during which they are logged 
off of their computers and free of any work related duties.  
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act does require employers to compensate 
employees for all rest breaks of twenty minutes or less.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.  
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
  
American Future Systems, d/b/a Progressive Business 
Publications, publishes and distributes business publications 
and sells them through its sales representatives.  Edward 
Satell is the President, CEO, and owner of the company.  
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Sales representatives are paid an hourly wage and receive 
bonuses based on the number of sales per hour while they are 
logged onto the computer at their workstation.  They also 
receive extra compensation if they maintain a certain sales-
per-hour level over a given two-week period.  
  
Progressive previously had a policy that gave 
employees two fifteen-minute paid breaks per day.  In 2009, 
Progressive changed its policy by eliminating paid breaks but 
allowing employees to log off of their computers at any time.  
However, employees are only paid for time they are logged 
on.  Progressive refers to this as “flexible time” or “flex time” 
and explains that it “arises out of an employer’s policy that 
maximizes its employees’ ability to take breaks from work at 
any time, for any reason, and for any duration.”2  
 Furthermore, under this policy, every two weeks, sales 
representatives estimate the total number of hours that they 
expect to work during the upcoming two-week pay period.  
They are subject to discipline, including termination, for 
failing to work the number of hours they commit to.3  
Progressive also sends representatives home for the day if 
their sales are not high enough4 and sets fixed work schedules 
or daily requirements for representatives when that is deemed 
necessary.5    
 Apart from those requirements, representatives can 
decide when they will work between the hours of 8:30 AM 
and 5:00 PM from Monday to Friday, so long as they do not 
work more than forty hours each week.6  As noted above, 
during the work day, they can log off of their computers at 
any time, for any reason, and for any length of time and may 
leave the office when they are logged off.  Employees choose 
their start and end time and can take as many breaks as they 
please.  However, Progressive only pays sales representatives 
                                              
2 Appellant’s Br. at 4. 
3 JA-201-06, 401, 479, 516, 525-31, 939-43, 1059, 1082, 
1252. 
4 JA-1064, 1083, 1093, 1220, 1250. 
5 JA-940-47. 
6 JA-523. 
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for time they are logged off of their computers if they are 
logged off for less than ninety seconds.  This includes time 
they are logged off to use the bathroom or get coffee. The 
policy also applies to any break an employee may decide to 
take after a particularly difficult sales call to get ready for the 
next call. On average, representatives are each paid for just 
over five hours per day at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 
per hour.7 
 The Secretary filed suit against Progressive and Satell 
alleging that they violated the FLSA by failing to pay the 
federal minimum wage to employees subject to this policy, 
and by failing to maintain mandatory time records.8  The 
Secretary of Labor argued that this policy violated section 6 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act9 “by failing to compensate . . 
. sales representative employees for break[s] of twenty 
minutes or less . . . .”10  The Secretary sought to recover 
unpaid compensation owed to Progressive’s employees, an 
equal amount in liquidated damages, and a permanent 
injunction enjoining Progressive from committing future 
violations.11   
 Progressive moved for summary judgment, and the 
Secretary moved for partial summary judgment on select 
issues, including its minimum wage claim and claim for 
liquidated damages.  The District Court denied Progressive’s 
motion and granted the Secretary’s motion in part.12  In doing 
so, the court noted that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) has 
                                              
7 JA-847. 
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 211(c).  
9 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
10 Appellee’s Br. at 2-3.  
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217.  
12 The Secretary moved for summary judgment on FLSA 
minimum wage liability, FLSA recordkeeping liability, and 
Satell’s role as an employer under the FLSA, liquidated 
damages, and willfulness, but not on the actual damages 
calculation.  The District Court denied the Secretary’s motion 
with respect to willfulness of the violations.  Perez v. Am. 
Future Sys., Inc., No. 12-6171, 2015 WL 8973055, at *1 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015).   
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consistently applied the Wage and Hour Division’s 
(“WHD”)13 interpretation of the FLSA under 29 C.F.R. § 
785.18 to this kind of break.  That regulation provides that: 
Rest periods of short duration, running from 5 
minutes to about 20 minutes, are common in 
industry.  They promote the efficiency of the 
employee and are customarily paid for as 
working time.  They must be counted as hours 
worked.  Compensable time of rest periods may 
not be offset against other working time such as 
compensable waiting time or on-call time.14 
The District Court afforded the Secretary’s interpretation of 
section 785.18 substantial deference.15   It agreed that section 
785.18 created a bright-line rule and concluded that 
Progressive therefore violated the FLSA by failing to pay its 
employees for rest breaks of twenty minutes or less.  This 
appeal followed. 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.16  
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact.17  In reviewing a 
motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.18  We refrain 
                                              
13 Congress delegated authority to WHD to administer the 
FLSA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“There is created in the 
Department of Labor a Wage and Hour Division which shall 
be under the direction of an Administrator, to be known as the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division . . . .”). 
14 29 C.F.R. § 785.18.   
15 See Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
16 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
17 See, e.g., Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police 
Dep’t, 98 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1996). 
18 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 
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from making credibility determinations or weighing the 
evidence.19  
 We review the District Court’s decision to deny or 
limit liquidated damages for abuse of discretion.20  Although 
we must apply the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52(a) when reviewing the District Court’s 
findings of fact “which underlie its ‘good faith’ and 
‘reasonableness’ determinations . . . and the finding of 
subjective good faith itself, we exercise plenary review of the 
[D]istrict [C]ourt’s legal conclusion that [a party] had 
‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that its violative conduct 
was not a violation of the FLSA.”21 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 Progressive advances three arguments on appeal: (1) 
that time spent logged off under its flexible break policy 
categorically does not constitute work; (2) that the District 
Court erred in finding that WHD’s interpretive regulation on 
breaks less than twenty minutes long, 29 C.F.R § 785.18, is 
entitled to substantial deference; and (3) that the District 
Court erred in adopting the bright-line rule embodied in 29 
C.F.R. § 785.18 rather than using a fact-specific analysis.  We 
do not find any of these arguments persuasive. 
A. Applicability of the FLSA 
 Progressive first argues that under its policy, because 
employees are basically free to do anything they choose and 
can even leave the job site when logged off of their 
computers, the time when employees are logged off of their 
computers does not constitute “work,” and therefore, the 
FLSA does not apply.  We disagree. 
                                              
19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
20 Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  
21 Id. (citation omitted).  
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 The FLSA governs compensation for “hours 
worked.”22  But it does not define “work.”23  It is well 
established that some breaks constitute “hours worked” under 
the FLSA.24  Thus, hours worked is not limited to the time an 
employee actually performs his or her job duties.25   The 
FLSA does not require employers to provide their employees 
with breaks.  However, if an employer chooses to provide 
short breaks of five to twenty minutes, the employer is 
required to compensate employees for such breaks as hours 
worked.26   
 Progressive argues that it does not have a “break 
policy” per se.  Rather, it claims that the “flexible time” 
policy described above, which allows employees to do 
whatever they wish and be wherever they want for periods of 
twenty minutes or less while logged off of their computers, 
does not constitute “hours worked.”  According to 
Progressive, since the FLSA does not require it to provide 
breaks, it does not need to compensate its employees for these 
periods.   
 Although Progressive’s position may have some 
superficial appeal, it cannot withstand scrutiny.  According to 
Progressive, if an employer has a policy allowing employees 
to log off and leave their work stations at any time, for any 
reason, it does not have to compensate employees if they take 
a break.  Progressive does not deny that it permits employees 
to log off; it just refuses to call those time periods “breaks.”  
This misses the point of the FLSA’s regulatory scheme.  Its 
protections cannot be negated by employers’ 
characterizations that deprive employees of rights they are 
                                              
22 29 C.F.R. § 778.224 (“Under the Act an employee must be 
compensated for all hours worked.”). 
23 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25 (2005).  
24 See Smiley v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 839 F.3d 
325, 331 (3d Cir. 2016).  
25 See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133-34 
(1944).  
26 See 29 C.F.R. § 785.18. 
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entitled to under the FLSA.27  The “log off” times are clearly 
“breaks” to which the FLSA applies.  
 The policy that Progressive refers to as “flexible time” 
forces employees to choose between such basic necessities as 
going to the bathroom or getting paid unless the employee 
can sprint from computer to bathroom, relieve him or herself 
while there, and then sprint back to his or her computer in less 
than ninety seconds.  If the employee can somehow manage 
to do that, he or she will be paid for the intervening period.  If 
the employee requires more than ninety seconds to get to the 
bathroom and back, the employee will not be paid for the 
period logged off of, and away from, the employee’s 
computer.  That result is absolutely contrary to the FLSA.28  
                                              
27 See Amicus Curiae A Better Balance and National 
Employment Law Project, Inc. Br. at 4 (“The FLSA was 
passed to ‘lessen, so far as seemed then practicable, the 
distribution in commerce of goods produced under subnormal 
labor conditions,’ Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 
U.S. 722, 727 (1947), by ‘insuring to all our able-bodied 
working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work.’ See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 
(1945) (quoting Message of the President to Congress, May 
24, 1937)”).  
28 Indeed, unless he or she has access to something akin to a 
Portkey, if an employee is sufficiently athletic to get from 
workstation to bathroom, relieve himself or herself, wash his 
or her hands, and return to the workstation in ninety seconds, 
it is highly unlikely that the employee would be working at 
Progressive for a minimum wage rather than playing for a 
professional sports franchise or advertising a brand of athletic 
footwear.  Moreover, given the time restraints imposed by 
certain biological necessities beyond the employee’s control, 
we doubt an employee could manage this feat even if he or 
she had access to a Portkey.  See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter 
and the Goblet of Fire 70 (Scholastic Inc. 1st ed. 2000) (In the 
Harry Potter series, Portkeys are “objects that are used to 
transport wizards from one spot to another . . . .”). 
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The FLSA is a “humanitarian and remedial legislation” and 
“has been liberally interpreted.”29 
 Although employers need not have any break policy, we 
refuse to hold that the FLSA allows employers to circumvent 
its remedial mandates by disguising a break policy as 
“flexible time,” as Progressive is seeking to do here.  
Accordingly, we find that Progressive does have a break 
policy, and thus, the FLSA applies.  We therefore must 
determine if this break policy is contrary to the FLSA.   
B. Skidmore Deference 
The FLSA is silent as to the specific requirements 
regarding “break” periods, but WHD’s interpretation is clear.  
The parties agreed at the District Court level that Skidmore30 
would determine the level of deference owed to WHD’s 
interpretation in section 785.18.  Progressive argues that the 
District Court overstated this level of deference.  It contends 
that WHD’s interpretation “do[es] not have the force of 
law.”31  Instead, the regulations are merely “positions [the 
DOL] will take in the enforcement of the Act.”32  While it is 
true that these interpretations are not technically “law,” the 
regulations nevertheless “constitute a body of experience and 
                                              
29 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(citing Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 
123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)). 
30 323 U.S. 134.  The parties agree that the level of deference 
required under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is not applicable.    
31 Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153, 157 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“In evaluating the effect of these regulations, it is 
significant to keep in mind that the Supreme Court has 
commented that interpretive regulations issued by the 
Secretary of the Department of Labor under the FLSA do not 
have the force of law; the regulations ‘constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” (quoting 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
32 29 C.F.R. § 785.2. 
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informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.”33 
 An agency’s interpretation of a statute “may merit 
some deference whatever its form, given the specialized 
experience and broader investigations and information 
available to the agency . . ., and given the value of uniformity 
in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a 
national law requires.”34  The weight afforded the agency’s 
interpretation “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”35  
 We have “adopted Mead’s conceptualization of the 
Skidmore framework as a ‘sliding-scale’ test in which the 
level of weight afforded to an interpretation varies depending 
on [the] analysis of the enumerated factors.”36  Those factors 
include whether the interpretation was: (1) issued 
contemporaneously with the statute; (2) consistent with other 
agency pronouncements; (3) reasonable given the language 
and purposes of the statute; (4) within the expertise of the 
relevant agency; and (5) part of a longstanding and 
unchanging policy.37   
                                              
33 Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 n.7 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. 
at 140). 
34 De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 349 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 228 (2001), 533 U.S. at 234-35) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
35 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
140). 
36 Hagans v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228). 
37 Id. at 304-05; see also Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 
167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999) (if an agency has been 
granted administrative authority by Congress, Skidmore 
deference is warranted “as long as it is consistent with other 
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 Applying these factors, we conclude that WHD’s 
interpretation, as set forth in section 785.18, should be 
afforded the highest level of deference under Skidmore.  First, 
Congress ratified WHD’s interpretation, which had been in 
place since 1940, by enacting former section 16(c) of the 
FLSA in 1949.38  It states that: 
Any order, regulation, or interpretation of the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division 
or of the Secretary of Labor . . . in effect under 
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938, as amended, on the effective date of 
this Act, shall remain in effect as an order, 
regulation, interpretation, . . . except to the 
extent that any such order, regulation, 
interpretation . . . may be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Act . . . .39 
 Second, WHD’s interpretation of the regulations 
controlling this dispute has been consistent throughout the 
various opinion letters the DOL has issued to address this 
matter.40  The Department of Labor   
                                                                                                     
agency pronouncements and furthers the purposes of the 
Act.”). 
38 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 n.8 (1956). 
39 Id. (citing Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. 
L. No. 393, section 16(c), 63 Stat. 910, 920 (1949), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 208 note). 
40 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter 
(Aug. 13, 1964) (JA 1351-52) (“[I]f [break] periods are given 
and are of short duration (normally 20 minutes or less) they 
must be counted as hours worked and the employees must 
receive compensation for them. . . .  The way in which the 
employee utilizes his time during the rest periods described in 
your letter, or the name attached to them, is irrelevant, and the 
absence of such breaks in the past would not relieve an 
employer from compensating his employees for them when 
they occur.”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., 
Opinion Letter (Oct. 13, 1964) (JA-1353) (“[R]est periods of 
short duration, running from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes, 
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has consistently held for over 46 years that such 
breaks are hours worked under the FLSA, 
without evaluating the relative merits of an 
employee’s activities.  This position [is] found 
at 29 C.F.R. 785.18 . . . .  The compensability of 
short breaks by workers has seldom, if ever, 
been questioned . . . .  The FLSA does not 
require an employer to provide its employees 
with rest periods or breaks.  If the employer 
decides to permit short breaks, however, the 
time is compensable hours worked.41 
 Third, we have no difficulty concluding that WHD’s 
interpretation is reasonable given the language and purpose of 
the FLSA.  In enacting the FLSA, Congress recognized the 
effect of labor conditions that are “detrimental to the 
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for 
                                                                                                     
must be counted as hours worked.”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Jan. 25, 1995) (JA-1361-
62) (“[R]est periods . . . of short duration, running from 5 to 
20 minutes are common in industry. . . .  It is our long-
standing position that such breaks must be counted as hours 
worked.  The fact that certain employees may choose to 
smoke during such breaks contrary to their employer’s policy 
would not, in our opinion, affect the compensability of such 
breaks. . . .  While there may be valid health reasons for 
prohibiting ‘smoking breaks,’ it does not follow that 
employee efficiency is not enhanced by such breaks as is the 
case with respect to ‘coffee breaks’.  In other words, we think 
it is immaterial with respect to compensability of such breaks 
whether the employee drinks coffee, smokes, goes to the 
restroom, etc. . . .  Our views should not, however, be 
construed to prevent an employer from adopting a policy that 
prohibits smoking in the workplace, or devising appropriate 
disciplinary procedures for violations of such policy.  But an 
employer may not arbitrarily fail to count time spent in breaks 
during the workday because the employee was smoking at his 
or her workplace or outside thereof.”). 
41 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 1996 WL 1005233, at *1 
(Dec. 2, 1996).  
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health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”42  The 
existence of such conditions: 
(1) causes commerce and the channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce to be used to 
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions 
among the workers of the several States; (2) 
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in 
commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of 
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor 
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce 
and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) 
interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of 
goods in commerce.43 
Accordingly, the FLSA was designed “to correct and as 
rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above 
referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power.”44  As the District Court 
explained, it is readily apparent that by safeguarding 
employees from having their wages withheld when they take 
breaks of twenty minutes or less “to visit the bathroom, 
stretch their legs, get a cup of coffee, or simply clear their 
head after a difficult stretch of work, the regulation 
undoubtedly protects employee health and general well-being 
by not dissuading employees from taking such breaks when 
they are needed.”45 
 This interpretation was well within WHD’s 
expertise.46  Lastly, as the District Court correctly 
pointed out, “[s]ection 785.18 is a rule that is both 
longstanding and unchanging.  The text of the rule 
today is identical to the text of the rule when it was 
                                              
42 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).  
43 Id. 
44 Id. § 202(b).  
45 Am. Future Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 8973055, at *7.  
46 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“There is created in the Department of 
Labor a Wage and Hour Division which shall be under the 
direction of an Administrator, to be known as the 
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division . . . .”). 
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implemented in 1961.”47 Since all of these factors 
favor WHD’s position, the District Court was correct 
to apply substantial Skidmore deference to section 
785.18. 
C. Applicability of 29 C.F.R. § 785.16 versus 29 
C.F.R. § 785.18 
  At the District Court level, Progressive also argued 
that because its employees used the time when they were 
logged off solely for their own benefit, 29 C.F.R. § 785.16, as 
opposed to 29 C.F.R. § 785.18, applies to its policy.48  Before 
addressing the issue of applying section 785.18 as a bright-
line rule, we wish to elaborate on this and note that the 
District Court correctly held that section 785.18 is applicable 
to this case. 
 Section 785.16 provides that: 
Periods during which an employee is 
completely relieved from duty and which are 
long enough to enable him to use the time 
effectively for his own purposes are not hours 
worked.  He is not completely relieved from 
duty and cannot use the time effectively for his 
own purposes unless he is definitely told in 
advance that he may leave the job and that he 
will not have to commence work until a 
definitely specified hour has arrived.  Whether 
the time is long enough to enable him to use the 
time effectively for his own purposes depends 
upon all of the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
Conversely, section 785.18 states that “[r]est periods of short 
duration, running from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes, are 
                                              
47 Am. Future Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 8973055, at *7 (citing 26 
Fed. Reg. 190 (Jan. 11, 1961)).  
48 Id. at *5. 
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common in industry . . . .  They must be counted as hours 
worked.”49 
 Progressive argued that section 785.16 is applicable 
here because the “breaks” at issue are unrestricted periods 
that Progressive provides to its employees to use whenever 
they want and however they want.  Thus, section 785.16, as 
opposed to section 785.18, applies. 
 As the District Court held, Progressive’s argument fails 
to recognize that, although section 785.16 provides general 
guidance regarding the compensability of hours worked, 
section 785.18 sets forth a separate and more specific 
regulation carving out the compensability of breaks that are 
twenty minutes or less.50  The Department of Labor has 
therefore determined as a matter of labor policy and practical 
consideration that breaks of twenty minutes or less are 
insufficient to allow for anything other than the kind of 
activity (or inactivity) that, by definition, primarily benefits 
the employer.  That is certainly true here where such short 
work intervals better prepare the sales representative to deal 
with the next call.  Thus, as the District Court correctly 
explained, in this case where breaks of twenty minutes or 
less are in question, section 785.16 is inapplicable.  We 
therefore hold that section 785.18 applies to Progressive’s 
“flexible time” policy. 
D. 29 C.F.R. § 785.18 as a bright-line rule 
 
 Progressive also argues that section 785.18 should not 
be enforced as a bright-line rule that would require employers 
to compensate employees for any breaks that are twenty 
minutes or less.51  Rather, Progressive insists that courts 
                                              
49 29 C.F.R. § 785.18 (emphasis added). 
50 See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (“It is a 
fundamental principle of statutory construction that the 
specific language controls over general language.”).  
51 By statute, short breaks to express breast milk need not be 
compensated, 29 U.S.C. § 207(4), and unauthorized 
extensions of authorized paid breaks need not be 
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should analyze whether a given break is intended to benefit 
the employer or the employee.  According to Progressive, if 
the break benefits the employee, she need not be 
compensated.  In support of its argument, Progressive cites 
Mitchell v. Greinetz,52 which section 785.18 incorporates in 
interpreting the FLSA,53 and Armour & Co. v. Wantock.54  
We remain unconvinced. 
 Progressive claims that Greinetz mandates a fact-
intensive inquiry to determine when idle time is 
compensable.55  However, Progressive ignores that the 
Greinetz court deferred to WHD’s interpretation and that 
several courts considering the issue have applied section 
785.18 as a bright-line rule.56  Greinetz noted that facts must 
                                                                                                     
compensated. Lillehagan v. Alorica, Inc., No. SACV 13-
0092-DOC, 2014 WL 6989230, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 
2014) (citing Chapter 31a01(c) of DOL Field Operations 
Handbook, Dec. 15, 2000). 
52 235 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1956).  
53 See 29 C.F.R. § 785.18. 
54 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).  
55 Mitchell, 235 F.2d at 623 (“Whether idle time is 
compensable or not is sometimes a difficult question to 
answer.  All the cases make it clear that under certain 
conditions it is a part of employment time and must, 
therefore, be compensated.  While in the main the factors 
which must be considered are well known, the difficulty as 
always comes when we undertake to apply them to a given 
state of facts, and because facts differ decided cases are not 
controlling and are helpful only as they point the way.  Some 
of the factors to consider are whether idle time is spent 
predominantly for the employer’s or employee’s benefit, and 
whether the time is of sufficient duration and taken under 
such conditions that it is available to employees for their own 
use and purposes disassociated from their employment time.  
The cases also make it clear that the answers to these 
questions must be gleaned from all the facts and 
circumstances of each case.” (emphases added)). 
56 See Lillehagen v. Alorica, No. 13-0092, 2014 WL 6989230, 
at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014); Brown v. L & P Indus., 
LLC, No. 04-0379, 2005 WL 3503637, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 
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be considered in determining if breaks are compensable hours 
worked.  However, it also held that WHD’s interpretation 
“adhered to since 1940 is entitled to great weight”57 and that 
the court agreed with WHD “as to the correct interpretation of 
the Act as it relates to the question of short break periods, 
generally referred to as ‘coffee breaks.’”58  The court 
explained that although such breaks “are beneficial to the 
employees, they are equally beneficial to the employer in that 
they promote more efficiency and result in a greater output, 
and that this increased production is one of the primary 
factors, if not the prime factor, which leads the employer to 
institute such break periods.” 59   The court also noted that “a 
number of states by statute or orders provide for short rest 
periods and provide that such periods shall be compensated as 
work time.”60  Accordingly, Progressive’s reliance on 
Greinetz is misplaced, as section 785.18 likely referred to it 
because it explicitly endorsed the interpretation.    
 Progressive’s reliance on Armour & Co. is also not 
persuasive.  We realize that the Supreme Court did not apply 
a bright-line rule in Armour & Co.61  However, Progressive 
ignores the crucial fact that Armour & Co. did not involve the 
compensability of breaks of twenty minutes or less.  It 
concerned the time between 5 PM to 8 AM during which 
firefighters “were required to be on their employer’s 
premises, to some extent amenable to the employer’s 
                                                                                                     
21, 2005); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perform. Plastics Corp., 
556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (W.D. Wisc. 2008); Martin v. 
Waldbaum, Inc., No. CV 86-0861, 1992 WL 314898, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1992). 
57 Greinetz, 235 F.2d at 625.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 323 U.S. at 133 (“Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as 
much as service itself, and time spent lying in wait for threats 
to the safety of the employer’s property may be treated by the 
parties as a benefit to the employer.  Whether time is spent 
predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the 
employee’s is a question dependent upon all the 
circumstances of the case.”).  
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discipline, subject to call, but not engaged in any specific 
work.”62  The Court used the predominant benefit test to 
conclude that this time was compensable.  The Secretary does 
not argue that this test should not be used when dealing with 
breaks of twenty-one minutes or more,63 and compensability 
of breaks longer than twenty minutes is not before us.  
 Progressive’s argument for determining the 
compensability of break times is not only contrary to the 
regulatory scheme and case law, it would also establish an 
administrative regimen that would be burdensome and 
                                              
62 Id. at 128.  
63 DOL’s 1940 Press Release states:  
Employees coming under the provisions of the [FLSA] must 
be paid for short rest periods . . . .  A “short” rest period 
…will include periods up to and including 20 minutes.  When 
rest periods customarily taken by employees are longer, final 
decision on whether or not the employee will be paid for it 
will rest with the [WHD] Regional Director.  The following 
considerations will guide the Regional Director in making his 
decision: the freedom of the employee to leave the premises 
and go where he pleases during the intermission; the duration 
of the intermission—whether sufficient to permit the 
employee reasonable freedom of action and a real opportunity 
for relaxation; whether the intermission is clearly not an 
attempt to evade or circumvent the provisions of the [FLSA].  
See Addendum A to Appellee’s Br. (WHD Press Release No. 
R-837 (June 10, 1940)) (emphasis added); see also 
Addendum C to Appellee’s Br. (Field Operations Handbook, 
31a01 (Dec. 1955)) (“Rest periods of short duration, running 
from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes, are common in industry.  
They promote the efficiency of the employee and are 
customarily paid for as working time.  They must be counted 
as hours worked. . . .  Where a regular rest period of known 
duration is longer than 20 minutes, the waiting time rules 
apply.  In other words, if the employees are free to go where 
they please, and the rest period is long enough to permit the 
employees to use it for their own purposes, and if bona fide 
and not an attempt to evade or circumvent the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) or Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act 
(PCA), such periods are not hours worked.”). 
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unworkable.  Employers would have to analyze each break 
every employee takes to determine whether it primarily 
benefitted the employee or employer.  Such an approach 
“would require a series of tests to evaluate the relative benefit 
provided to employee and employer and the impact on 
employee efficiency of each and every small work break ever 
taken by any employee.”64  This would not only be “an 
undesirable regulatory intrusion in the workplace with the 
potential to seriously disrupt many employer-employee 
relationships,” but it would also be difficult, if not impossible, 
to implement in all workplace settings.65  “[T]he government 
should not be in the business of determining what employees 
do on short work breaks, much less attempting to evaluate 
which short breaks merit or do not merit compensation. . . .  
[E]mployers and employees are best served by the bright line 
time test currently provided in Section 785.18.”66 
 Nevertheless, Progressive argues that if a bright-line 
rule is enforced, employees will be allowed to take any 
number of breaks during their workday, and as long as they 
are less than twenty minutes, employers will have to 
compensate them.  We recognize this is a theoretical 
possibility given the bright line imposed by section 785.18.67  
However, it is not a realistic one.  “[W]here the employee is 
taking multiple, unscheduled nineteen-minute breaks over and 
above his or her scheduled breaks for example, the 
                                              
64 Lillehagen, 13-0092, 2014 WL 6989230, at *5. 
65 Id. at *5-6.  
66 Id.   
67 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion 
Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 1996 WL 1005233, 
at *1 (employer requested that Department of Labor advise 
whether short smoking breaks of 3 to 4 minutes were 
compensable when taken in addition to other breaks allowed 
to employees, and the DOL stated “[t]he FLSA does not 
require an employer to provide its employees with rest 
periods or breaks. If the employer decides to permit short 
breaks, however, the time is compensable hours worked”). 
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employer’s recourse is to discipline or terminate the 
employee—not to withhold compensation.”68   
 Progressive notes that the sales representatives: 
may log-off of the computer system at any time 
of the day, for any reason, and for any length of 
time, at which point, if they so choose, they 
may leave the office. . . . Others may work non-
stop from the time they arrive until they decide 
to leave for the day.  In other words, [they] 
choose the time they start, the time they stop, 
and whether and how much time they take off 
in-between.69 
In an argument that is no doubt well-intentioned, Amicus 
Child Advocates argues that this “flex time” policy allows 
parents to address child-related needs and that it is essential 
for “all parents whose children are in out-of-home placement 
in foster care, and can provide tremendous benefits to parents 
. . . to deal with essential responsibilities such as scheduling 
second jobs, attending child-related appointments and . . . 
handling family-related issues . . ., and providing care for 
their children.”70  Amicus Childs Advocates also alerts us to a 
client it represented “who was placed in foster care because 
her mother was drug addicted.  . . . [W]ithin two years, her 
mother had completed a drug and alcohol program, which 
allowed her daughter to move back in with her.”71   We do 
not doubt that such arguments by this Amicus result from a 
sincere effort to encourage flexible work place policies that 
are consistent with the organization’s efforts to advance the 
welfare of at-risk children who have a particular need for 
parental support.  However, those arguments, and similar 
arguments by Progressive, ignore the fact that the examples 
of employees’ use of “break” time that Progressive presents 
                                              
68 Hawkins v. Alorica, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 431, 442 (S.D. Ind. 
2012).  
69 Appellant’s Br. at 6. 
70 Amicus Curiae Support Center for Child Advocates’ Br. at 
4 
71 Id. at 2.   
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involve activities that cannot generally be performed in 
twenty minutes.  Thus, such examples exaggerate the extent 
to which the policy is intended to benefit the individual 
employee as opposed to the employer.  This is particularly 
true if we factor in time getting to and from transportation to 
get to one’s child (or to earn a degree or hold a second job).  
Accordingly, the restrictions endemic in the limited duration 
of twenty minutes or less illustrate the wisdom of concluding 
that the Secretary intended a bright line rule under the 
applicable regulations. 
E. Liquidated Damages 
 Progressive also argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion in awarding liquidated damages.    
If an employer violates the minimum wage provisions 
of the FLSA, it is liable for both the payment of unpaid wages 
and an additional equal amount of mandatory liquidated 
damages.72  Liquidated damages are compensatory.  They 
ease any hardship endured by employees who were deprived 
of lawfully earned wages.73 
 To avoid mandatory liability for liquidated damages, 
an employer must show that it acted in good faith and that it 
had reasonable grounds for believing that it was not violating 
the Act.74  The good faith requirement is “a subjective one 
that requires that the employer have an honest intention to 
                                              
72 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (“The Secretary may bring an action in 
any 
court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of 
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an 
equal amount as liquidated damages.”); Cooper Elec. Supply 
Co., 940 F.2d at 907. 
73 Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“These liquidated damages are compensatory rather 
than punitive in nature; they compensate employees for the 
losses they may have suffered by reason of not receiving their 
proper wages at the time they were due.”). 
74 29 U.S.C. § 260; Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1299. 
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ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act.”75  The 
reasonableness requirement is an objective standard.76  An 
employer bears a “plain and substantial” burden to prove it is 
entitled to discretionary relief from liquidated damages.77 
 Here, Progressive’s insufficient efforts to investigate 
and comply with the FLSA neither satisfy that substantial 
burden, nor undermine the propriety of the District Court’s 
finding of bad faith.  Satell stated that he changed 
Progressive’s policy in 2009 to “ensure that employees across 
all call centers were being treated equally with respect to 
breaks, and specifically rebuked the suggestion that the policy 
change was motivated by the close-in-time increase in the 
minimum wage.”78  He explains that in fashioning the policy, 
he reviewed the DOL website, and “‘then tr[ied] to get as 
much guidance as [he] could from the [Department of 
Labor].’”79  Satell also obtained legal advice and read several 
opinions from various courts on the matter.80  Additionally, 
he held about a dozen meetings with Progressive’s Director of 
Call Center Operations to discuss the new policy.81  However, 
he admits that he was at least “vaguely aware” of 29 C.F.R. § 
785.18.82 
 In assessing liquidated damages, the District Court 
noted that Satell sought advice of counsel, but he refused to 
waive the attorney-client privilege and disclose this advice to 
the court.  Satell’s testimony placed the court in an untenable 
position of having to assume that counsel’s advice was 
                                              
75 Cooper Elec. Supply, 940 F.2d at 907 (alterations, citations, 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
76 Id. at 907-08; Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (“an employer may not rely on ignorance alone in 
meeting the objective test.”). 
77 Cooper Elec. Supply, 940 F.2d at 907 (quoting Williams v. 
Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 128-29 (3d Cir. 
1984).  
78 Am. Future Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 8973055, at *13. 
79 Id. (alterations in original).  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
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consistent with the adopted policy while ignoring the fact that 
Satell refused to tell the court what counsel advised.  The 
District Court concluded that, given the unwillingness to 
share what it was told by counsel, “it is entirely possible that 
Defendants implemented the new break policy in 2009, 
despite being told by one or more of its lawyers that the 
policy violated the FLSA.  It would be an absurd result to 
classify such conduct as ‘good faith’ . . . .”83  
 Progressive argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in finding that it did not act in good faith when 
setting its break policy simply because Progressive refused to 
waive its attorney-client privilege.  It claims that the District 
Court’s decision punishes Progressive for seeking legal 
advice that was not essential to a good-faith determination, as 
employers are not required to seek legal advice to 
demonstrate good faith.  Thus, according to Progressive, the 
District Court’s decision will discourage open and confident 
relationships between clients and attorneys.  That may be so, 
but we, like Judge Restrepo, are incredulous that an employer 
in this situation would decline to share the legal advice it 
received when the issue of good faith is raised, and we will 
not preclude a court from considering this in its thought 
process. 
 Further, the District Court’s unwillingness to find good 
faith was not based solely upon Satell’s refusal to waive the 
attorney-client privilege.  Rather, it was the logical result of 
the Court’s analysis of the entire record.  Even if we ignore 
the fact that Progressive sought legal advice and refused to 
disclose the substance of that advice, we would still find that 
Satell did not have reasonable grounds for believing that he 
was comporting with the FLSA.  Merely reviewing case law 
and looking at the DOL website does not establish that he 
acted reasonably because, as we have explained, that case law 
and website would have informed him of the bright line rule 
in section 785.18.  The DOL has explicitly and repeatedly 
stated that employees must be paid for breaks of twenty 
minutes or less.  Selective interpretation of its rulings may 
establish wishful thinking or obstinacy, but it certainly does 
                                              
83 Am. Future Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 8973055, at *13. 
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not establish that the District Court abused its discretion in 
declining to find good faith and awarding liquidated damages.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s order granting in part the Secretary’s partial motion 
for summary judgment with respect to FLSA minimum wage 
liability and liquidated damages.   
